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Abstract: 
 
Paulina Sliwa (2015) argues that knowing why p is necessary and sufficient for understanding 
why p . She tries to rebut recent attacks against the necessity and sufficiency claims, and explains 
the gradability of understanding why in terms of knowledge. I argue that her attempts do not 
succeed, but I indicate some ways to defend reductionism about understanding why. 
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Articles: 
 
I 
 
Reductionism about Understanding Why . Focusing on understanding why p , Sliwa tries to 
defend the thesis that ‘instances of understanding reduce to the corresponding instances of 
knowledge’ (2015 , p. 58) and thus: 
 
UNDERSTANDING WHY IS KNOWING WHY 
S understands why p iff S knows why p . 
 
Knowledge why is analysed as knowledge of causes of the phenomenon described by p ; it 
amounts to knowing a so-called causal proposition of the form ‘ p because q ’ (cf. Kvanvig 
2003 ; Pritchard 2014 ; Grimm 2014 ; Kelp 2014 ; Sliwa 2015 ). 1 Take Pritchard’s (2008 , 
p. 332) illustration: ‘to know why my house burned down is just to know that it burned down 
because of (say) faulty wiring’. 
 
KNOWING WHY 
S knows why p iff there is some q such that S knows that (p because q). 
 
Knowing why amounts to knowing a complex proposition. Hence it is factive, not immune to 
non-benign epistemic luck, and can be transmitted by testimony. 
 
Given KNOWING WHY , the reductionist claim at stake is: 
 
UNDERSTANDING WHY IS KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSES 
S understands why p iff there is some q such that S knows that (p because q). 
 
Sliwa tries to rebut recent arguments against the necessity and sufficiency claims and explains 
the gradability of understanding why in terms of knowledge. I argue that these attempts do not 
succeed, but suggest more promising ways throughout the discussion. 
 
II 
 
Arguments against the Necessity Claim . The necessity claim is challenged by cases which seem 
to show that understanding why is immune to some non-benign epistemic luck (Kvanvig 
2003 ; Pritchard 2008 , 2009, 2014 ; Hills 2009 ; Morris 2012). Most cases involve so-called 
environmental luck: the subjects gain understanding why by acquiring the relevant justified true 
beliefs. But they do not gain knowledge why, because they just luckily pick a knowledgeable 
source among mostly non-knowledgeable sources, and could have easily picked one of the latter. 
So there is understanding why without knowledge why. 
 
Sliwa tackles this attack in two ways. First, she points out that sentences like ‘I understand 
why p , but I don’t know why p ’ and ‘ S understands why p , but S does not know why p ’ seem 
infelicitous. Since there is no pragmatic explanation for this defect, she argues that they ‘sound 
infelicitous [because] they are contradictory. This is because understanding entails knowing’ 
( Sliwa 2015 , p. 61). 
 
One could rebut this argument by claiming that the alleged defectiveness of such sentences is 
due to the fact that understanding why and knowledge why only come apart in rare cases. Sliwa 
rejects this attempt by offering her second argument: she argues that situations in which people 
luckily pick the right source or evidence when they could have easily picked a misleading one 
‘are decidedly not rare’ ( 2015 , p. 62). Analogous examples are detectives and doctors luckily 
stumbling upon crucial clues. It is common ground that such luck is benign and compatible with 
knowledge ( 2015 , p. 63). Sliwa thus reclassifies the cases: instead of being rare cases of 
environmental luck, they turn out to be common cases of benign luck. Grimm (2006) , Khalifa 
(2013) and Kelp (2014) offer similar arguments. 
 
Sliwa’s first argument does not provide conclusive evidence for the necessity claim as long as 
the rare-case defence is possible. Reclassifying the employed cases is thus decisive. But even if it 
is correct, it would only show that understanding why and knowledge why do not come apart in 
such cases. Any similar case in which no benign luck (re-)classification is possible would still 
provide a counterexample to the necessity claim; and Pritchard has already provided such a case: 
 
Kate 2 forms her belief regarding the cause of the chemical reaction by employing an 
instrument. … [T]he instrument … is not malfunctioning, and so delivers her the correct 
result. But … [it] very nearly did malfunction, such that in most nearby possible worlds 
where Kate employs this instrument it would be malfunctioning and so at best only 
delivering the correct result by chance. … [H]ad the instrument malfunctioned Kate 
would not have noticed. ( Pritchard 2014 , pp. 316–17) 
 
Pritchard claims that Kate gains understanding why. She detected the cause and understands how 
cause and effect are related. Yet she does not acquire knowledge why, because her instrument 
could have stopped working while she was using it, but luckily it did not. Importantly, this luck 
differs crucially from the luck involved in the reclassified cases. The subject does not luckily 
pick a good source, but luckily gets the correct result from an unreliable source. According to 
standard knowledge conceptions, unreliability or non-safety prevents acquiring knowledge. 
Thus, there are (perhaps rare) cases in which knowledge why and understanding why seem to 
come apart. 
 
However, reductionists may argue for a more general claim: the belief acquisition’s aetiology 
matters equally for understanding why and knowing why (contra Kvanvig 2003 and Morris 
2012 ). If unreliability excludes knowledge, it also excludes understanding why; the same holds 
for lucky guesses and so on. So Kate does not gain understanding why either. If such an 
argument succeeded, no case of non-benign luck would threaten the necessity claim. 3 
 
III 
 
Arguments against the Sufficiency Claim . The sufficiency claim is challenged by cases of 
testimony in which someone acquires knowledge why though not understanding why (see, for 
instance, Pritchard 2008 , 2009, 2014 ; Hills 2009 , 2015 ). Here is a case from Pritchard (2008 , 
pp. 335–6): A child gains knowledge that (a house burned down because of faulty wiring) via 
testimony from a reliable person. While this person understands why the house burned down 
because she also knows how the faulty wiring caused the fire, the child does not acquire the latter 
knowledge and thus no understanding why. Any case of learning a proposition of the form 
‘ p because q ’ by consulting a reliable source, yet lacking epistemic grip on the relation between 
cause and effect, provides such a counterexample. In addition, some argue that understanding 
why requires grasping of the relevant propositions (e.g. Strevens 2013 , Grimm 2014 ), or the 
ability to give a complete explanation for why p (e.g. Elgin 2007 , Pritchard 2014 , Hills 2015 ). 
 
Sliwa does not address the latter demands, but tries to rebut the cases. Like Morris (2012) 
and Grimm (2014) , she argues that the child acquires some understanding why, because 
 
the more we fill in the case to make it plausible that the child does not understand why 
the house burned down, the less plausible it is that the child knows why … Thus, suppose 
that the child truly hasn’t the faintest clue what faulty wiring could possibly be … In this 
case, he [also does not] know that the house burned down because of faulty wiring. 
(Sliwa 2015 , pp. 69–70) 
 
But even conceding that having no clue about faulty wiring prevents knowledge acquisition, 
Sliwa’s defence is beside the point. The reason why understanding why is denied is not that the 
subjects do not understand what the terms involved mean; it is denied because the subjects do not 
know how the cause led to the effect, although they know what is causally decisive. As Pritchard 
puts it, ‘[one] should have a sound epistemic grip on why cause and effect are related in this way 
[in order to have any understanding why]’ (2014 , p. 316; similarly Hills 2015). This grip is 
claimed to be essential, though its quality can vary, as can the quality of understanding why. 
Crucially, knowing that p because q ensures neither this grip nor the ability to give a complete 
explanation. 
 
The only promising option for reductionists is to argue that understanding why has a lower 
minimal threshold. Minimal understanding why does not require a grasp or the ability to give a 
complete explanation, and it has already been achieved if someone knows that x is the cause 
of y . This is because the latter amounts to acquiring some grip on the relation between cause and 
effect, namely, the modal belief that if x had not been the case, y would not have occurred (for a 
similar point see Grimm 2014 ). This belief seems to follow from believing that x is the cause 
of y , because this modal relation seems essential for being a cause (cases of redundant causation 
excluded). Such a belief is not about how the cause caused the effect in particular, but it is at 
least a belief about their interrelation. Nonetheless, it is not clear how to win this threshold 
debate without engaging in a quarrel about intuitions regarding understanding why ascriptions. 
 
IV 
 
The Challenge of Gradability . A further challenge for reductionists is to explain the gradability 
of understanding why: one can understand why a phenomenon occurred better than someone 
else. To explain this difference in terms of knowledge why does not seem possible, because 
knowing a relevant causal proposition does not seem to be gradable. Instead, Sliwa’s basic 
suggestion is that the differences in degree can be explained by differences in the amount of 
knowledge about the cause, its effect and their relation. So, while knowing that p because q is 
necessary and sufficient for some understanding why, ‘[b]etter understanding is simply a matter 
of more knowledge’ ( Sliwa 2015 , p. 69). Nonetheless, ‘all instances of understanding why … 
bottom out in propositional knowledge’ ( 2015 , p. 67). Sliwa underpins her idea as follows. The 
differences in understanding why are due to the fact that the overall belief systems differ (before 
and after acquiring the causal proposition). In the case of the child, ‘the [informant] knows more 
about what caused the house fire than the child. … And this knowledge is propositional in 
nature’ ( 2015 , pp. 68–9, italics omitted). Hence, the individuals differ regarding which 
possibilities the causal proposition allows them to exclude. The child might only exclude that the 
house was deliberately set on fire, but the informant can also exclude that ‘an unattended electric 
heater, a forgotten candle, a careless smoker [caused the fire]’ ( 2015 , p. 67). Moreover, the 
individuals differ regarding what they learn from acquiring the relevant causal proposition. The 
informant may further deliberate ‘whether the faulty wiring in question was a matter of a broken 
fuse or frayed cable insulation’ ( 2015 , p. 68). This option is not available to the child either. 
 
While nobody doubts that differences in the amount of knowledge can lead to differences in 
quality of understanding why, Sliwa’s account faces the following flaws. It seems questionable 
that merely piling up knowledge leads to an improvement in quality. One could imagine 
someone who collects many pieces of information but does not know their interrelation. What he 
or she gains is probably not a better understanding than someone who knows a lesser but 
connected amount of information. The subject may know that p because q , and may learn all 
relevant parts about a given causal process, but in a random order. As long as the subject does 
not know how the parts are related, he or she fails to acquire (a better) understanding why. It also 
seems to be relevant how significant the collected pieces of knowledge are. A small but highly 
significant amount of knowledge seems more decisive for the quality of understanding than a 
large but less significant amount. 
 
But reductionists need not be at their wit’s end. They could explore the explanatory power of the 
following option. One could account for the gradability of understanding why in terms of a 
coherent body of connected relevant knowledge. The gradability could be due to variances in 
breadth (the more comprehensive, the broader), depth (the more tightly woven, the deeper), and 
significance. (For descriptions of such properties see, for example, Elgin 2007 , Greco 2014 .) 
 
V 
 
Conclusion . Sliwa’s arguments do not provide good enough evidence for reductionism about 
understanding why. But reductionists could save their claim by showing the following: 
 
• (i) Knowledge why and understanding why have the same relationship to non-benign 
epistemic luck. 
• (ii) The minimal threshold of understanding why is rather low. 
• (iii) Abilities and grasping are not essential for understanding why or can be achieved by 
acquiring knowledge. 
• (iv) A body of connected relevant knowledge accounts for the gradability of 
understanding why. 4 
 
Notes 
 
1. To allow for non-causal explanations one may replace ‘knowledge of causes’ by ‘knowledge 
of dependencies’ (see, for example, Greco 2014 ; Grimm 2014 ). 
 
2. The asterisks Pritchard uses to distinguish between different Kates are omitted. 
 
3. See, for example, Grimm (2006) and DePaul and Grimm (2007) for attempts to argue along 
these lines, and Pritchard (2008) for an argument that understanding why is not immune to other 
kinds of non-benign epistemic luck. 
 
4. I would like to thank Raphael van Riel, Emily Sullivan and Dan Lawler for discussing this 
paper with me. Support for this research by a scholarship from the German Academic Exchange 
Service ( DAAD ) and by the Volkswagen Foundation for the project ‘A Study in Explanatory 
Power’ is also gratefully acknowledged. 
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